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Clifford G. Holderness and Dennis P.  Sheehan 
There is a growing belief among both academics and practitioners that 
firm  performance  can often  be  improved  by  large-block  shareholders. 
These can be either individuals or entities (such as other corporations or 
partnerships) that own large-percentage blocks of stock and work with or 
join management to improve firm performance. Concentrated ownership 
is viewed as ameliorating the separation of  ownership from control that 
has been long seen as a bane of large public corporations. 
There  is a major  potential  problem  with  large  investors,  however,  a 
problem that is often overlooked. The very thing that gives large investors 
the ability to improve management, the voting power of block ownership, 
also gives them the power to consume corporate resources, either through 
poor management or by outright expropriation. Consider, for example, a 
chief executive who owns more than 50 percent of his firm’s stock. What 
constrains this individual from maximizing the firm’s expected cash flows 
and then  expropriating those cash flows through excess compensation, 
consuming perquisites, borrowing from the firm at below-market interest 
rates, paying differential  dividends, or the like? This apparently is what 
Robert Maxwell did at two large public corporations. Likewise, what will 
stop a  block  investor’s well-intentioned  but  ill-conceived  management? 
This describes the path of Wang Laboratories into bankruptcy. 
Block investors who do not join management pose a similar threat. For 
instance, management can place a block of “sweetheart” preferred stock 
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with  an investor  with  the understanding that the investor  will  support 
management in control contests. The large-block investment made in the 
Polaroid  Corporation by  Corporate Partners during an attempted  take- 
over in the late 1980s appears to be such a case. Outside blockholders also 
have the capability to use their voting power to secure favorable contracts 
with the firm. 
Legal scholars have long held that the law does not effectively constrain 
block  shareholders. Rock  (1  994, 989), for example,  describes  Delaware 
corporate law,  federal securities law, and federal antitrust law as “rather 
toothless [for limiting] corrupt relational investing.” Gilson (1986, quoting 
in part Eisenberg  1976, 309) summarizes,  “The academic evaluation  of 
[legal] limitations . . . is unambiguous. . . . The checks on unfair dealing 
by  the parent are few.  In theory, of course, the fairness of the parent’s 
behavior  is subject to the check of judicial  review; but in practice such 
review is difficult even where the courts have the will to engage in it, and 
they often lack the will.’”  If such assessments are correct, the potential for 
block investors to improve firm performance would be more limited than 
currently acknowledged. 
The pessimism over the potential of the law to constrain block investors 
is based on reading cases and statutes. We know of no empirical evidence 
on the subject. In this paper, we  empirically investigate whether the con- 
ventional wisdom on the ineffectiveness of legal constraints on block in- 
vestors is warranted. We base most of our analyses on firms that presum- 
ably offer the most latitude for opportunistic behavior  toward  minority 
shareholders: firms in which one shareholder owns more than 50 percent 
of the common stock. These firms should illustrate most clearly the con- 
straints, if any, on block investors. 
We  start by documenting  that firms with concentrated  ownership are 
surviving and do not appear to trade at substantial discounts to firms with 
diffuse ownership. This suggests that something constrains  block  inves- 
tors-minority  shareholders are not totally at the mercy  of their larger 
brethren.  We  next  investigate  whether  organizational  mechanisms  are 
strengthened or modified to counterbalance the power of block investors. 
If so, the perceived weakness of the law would be relatively unimportant, 
as minority shareholders would rely on organizational constraints. 
Our empirical investigations reveal that boards of directors of majority- 
owned firms differ little from those of firms with diffuse stock ownership. 
Another  potential  organizational  constraint on majority  shareholders, 
capital market activity, also appears to differ little between firms with con- 
centrated  and firms with diffuse ownership. Likewise, there is  little evi- 
l. Although some such assessments are made in the context of parent-subsidiary relations. 
commentators  do  not seem to distinguish corporate large-block shareholders from individual 
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dence that new organizational  mechanisms have widely evolved to con- 
strain block investors. 
Finally,  we  review  the  much-criticized  legal  doctrines  applicable  to 
large-block  shareholders.  We  attempt to assess the effect of  these  con- 
straints by examining the frequency of and the wealth effects for minority 
shareholders  associated  with  mergers,  the going private,  restructurings, 
and liquidations  of  majority-shareholder  firms.  We  find  that  minority 
shareholders on average receive premia of 20 percent over preannounce- 
ment stock prices when they are bought out by majority shareholders- 
approximately the same premia that shareholders in diffusely held firms 
receive when they are bought out. This suggests that the law prevents ma- 
jority shareholders from using their voting power to freeze out minority 
shareholders  at low prices.  Despite these premia,  majority  shareholders 
buy out minority shareholders at least as often as do firms with relatively 
diffuse ownership. These payments appear in part to be the price that ma- 
jority shareholders must pay to remove the threat of minority-shareholder 
litigation. Additional evidence of  legal constraints comes from the treat- 
ment of minority shareholders in reorganizations that follow block trades, 
from comparing the  U.S. experience with the New Zealand  experience 
(New Zealand has few protections for minority shareholders), and from 
evidence on the treatment of minority shareholders in other countries. The 
totality of the evidence suggests that, counter to the opinion of many legal 
scholars, the law protects minority shareholders. Indeed, our findings raise 
the possibility that the law may be the primary constraint on large-block 
shareholders in public corporations. 
5.1  The Survival and Value Effects of Block Investors 
Some scholars  have  suggested  that the sole protection  for  minority 
shareholders might be price protection. That is to say, the price at which 
minority shareholders buy their stock simply reflects the discounted value 
of  the expected expropriation or incompetence of the firm’s large share- 
holders. 
Although price protection may exist, it can never be the sole protection 
for minority shareholders. If large-block  shareholders are subject to nei- 
ther organizational nor legal constraints, they could, through poor man- 
agement or by outright expropriation, consume corporate resources with- 
out limit. Once this possibility became known, a “lemons” problem would 
arise,  and individuals would  refuse to become minority shareholders  at 
any price. Ultimately, firms with block investors would not survive. This 
is why  Fama and Jensen (1983) conclude that firms in which chief execu- 
tive officers own a majority of the common stock will not survive. 
We start our analysis of the constraints on large shareholders by exam- 
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ship. If large-block  shareholders exist only infrequently,  one might con- 
clude that they are anomalies that are not destined  to last. Next, we  ex- 
amine a variety  of evidence on the effect of large shareholders  on firm 
value. This will give us insights into the possible importance of price pro- 
tection for minority shareholders. 
5.1.1 
The available evidence shows that many firms have concentrated owner- 
ship. Mikkelson  and Partch (1989) document that, in approximately 30 
percent of a random sample of 240 corporations listed on either the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the American Stock Exchange (Amex), 
the board and top officers control at least 20 percent of the votes. Holder- 
ness and Sheehan (1988) identify  663 NYSE- or Amex-listed firms with 
majority shareholders; they analyze 114 of these firms and document that, 
in over 90 percent of them, the majority shareholder or a representative 
of the corporate majority shareholder is a director or a top officer. They 
report that firms with majority shareholders appear to be surviving. Ritter 
(1981) documents that insiders retained on average 72 percent of the com- 
mon stock in the 559 firm-commitment  initial public offerings registered 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) between  1965 and 
1973.2 
Block investors have been around since the early days of the modern 
public corporation. J. P.  Morgan, for example, played a key role in reor- 
ganizing bankrupt railroads at the turn of the century. To facilitate the 
sale of securities in the reorganized firm, he typically would serve as chair- 
man of the company for several years, during which time he and his repre- 
sentatives ran the firm. De Long (1991) estimates that one Morgan partner 
on a board increased the value of the firm’s equity by  approximately 30 
percent. Goldman Sachs played  a similar role with retail firms. Finally, 
Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999) find that average inside owner- 
ship of the common stock among a large sample of U.S. exchange-listed 
firms increased from 13 percent in 1935 to 21 percent in 1995. 
The Survival of Firms with Block Investors 
5.1.2 
Murket-to-  Book Studies 
Firm Value and Large Shareholders 
Several studies measure the effect of large-block ownership on a firm’s 
market-to-book  ratio (the ratio of the market  value of  a firm’s assets to 
their replacement cost). In general, these studies offer little support for the 
proposition that block investors significantly reduce firm value, which they 
2. Additional evidence on the extent of large-block ownership among managers is reported 
in Demsetz (1983), Demsetz and Lehn (1985), and Herman (1981). Denis and Denis (1994) 
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would  do if  there  were few  constraints  on them.  Morck,  Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1988b) report that, for 371 Fortune 500 firms, the market-to-book 
ratio  increases when managerial  stockholdings  go from 0 to 5 percent, 
decreases between 5 and 25 percent, and increases above 25 percent. Mc- 
Connell and Servaes (1990) use a larger sample and find that, in one year 
studied (1986), the market-to-book ratio increases until top management 
owns 40 or 50 percent of  the stock and declines thereafter.  Holderness 
and Sheehan (1  988) find no significant difference in the market-to-book 
ratios for a paired sample of majority-owned and diffusely held firms. 
The strongest evidence that blockholders can reduce firm value comes 
from closed-end funds. Barclay, Holderness, and Pontiff (1993) find that, 
the greater the managerial stock ownership, the larger are the discounts to 
net asset value (book value). Even here, discounts seldom exceed 25 per- 
cent, suggesting that there are significant constraints on even the largest 
blockholders in closed-end funds. 
Equity Carve-Outs 
An equity carve-out occurs when a parent corporation sells partial own- 
ership interest in a subsidiary to the public. In most such reorganizations, 
the parent retains at least half the common stock and therefore controls 
the carved-out  subsidiary  (Schipper and Smith  1983; Klein, Rosenfeld, 
and Beranek  1991). 
Klein, Rosenfeld, and Beranek (1991) report that the parent eventually 
reacquired  the  subsidiary’s  publicly  held  shares  in  twenty-five  of  the 
eighty-three carve-outs between  1966 and  1983. (In fourteen additional 
cases, the parent sold its block lo a third party; nine of these buyers de- 
clared that they intended  to buy the public’s interest.) If block investors 
are unconstrained, it is unclear why individuals voluntarily invest in carve- 
outs and why parent corporations so often go to the expense of reacquir- 
ing the public’s shares. 
Klein, Rosenfeld, and Beranek  (1991, 457) further report that the an- 
nouncements of these reacquisitions are associated with insignificant ab- 
normal stock returns for the parent firms. In contrast, public shareholders 
in the subsidiary earn statistically positive abnormal returns that approxi- 
mate those earned by  target firms in arm’s-length  mergers  and acquisi- 
tions. The authors interpret this evidence to suggest “that parents did not 
generally take advantage of their dominant positions to capture gains ac- 
cruing to subsidiary shareholders.” 
Thermo Electron 
A final observation  comes from the Thermo Electron Corporation,  a 
NYSE company that has done twenty-three carve-outs of publicly traded 
firms and still retains majority ccntrol in all. In SEC filings Thermo Elec- 
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and officers and by  providing a variety  of legal, accounting, and finan- 
cial services. 
As of  1998, the value of Thermo Electron’s shares in its subsidiaries 
exceeded the market value of Thermo Electron itself by  16 percent (about 
$1 billi~n).~  This arguably understates the discount of Thermo Electron to 
its controlled subsidiaries because it places no value on Thermo Electron’s 
own operations. Thermo Electron thus offers no evidence that block inves- 
tors substantially  reduce firm value.  Indeed, this evidence suggests that 
any subsidies go from the dominant parent to the subsidiaries. 
5.1.3  Summary 
Two points emerge from the evidence presented above. First, firms with 
large shareholders appear to be surviving. Second, the evidence of the ef- 
fect of large shareholders on firm value is mixed. There is no evidence, how- 
ever, that block investors have a large negative effect on firm value. In short, 
the evidence-from  a number of studies, over different time periods, repre- 
senting a cross section  of industries-strongly  suggests that large-block 
shareholders in public corporations are constrained and that the primary 
constraint is not price protection. 
5.2  Organizational Constraints on Block Investors 
In spite of the evidence presented above of the survival and value effects 
of block investors, the widespread criticisms of the ineffectiveness of the 
law could still be correct if the binding constraints are organizational, not 
legal. We  therefore investigate whether organizational  constraints are al- 
tered to counterbalance the additional power that comes with large-block 
investors. We  also search for evidence of innovative organizational  con- 
straints in firms with block investors. 
Turner Broadcasting Corporation (one of the firms in our sample, de- 
scribed below) illustrates how existing organizational mechanisms can be 
modified and new ones developed to constrain a large-block shareholder 
(Holderness and Sheehan 1991). Since taking his firm public in 1980, Ted 
Turner owned a majority of the common stock and relied primarily on 
debt and retained earnings to finance an ambitious expansion into cable 
television and satellite broadcasting.  In early 1987, Turner Broadcasting 
had a debt-to-total  asset ratio of 0.72; by May of that year, it was appar- 
ent that the company would have difficulty meeting its debt obligations. 
Accordingly, Turner contracted with a group of cable companies to pur- 
3. These figures come from Thermo Electron itself, which values the publicly traded sub- 
sidiaries at closing prices as of 22 June 1998 and values the wholly  owned subsidiaries at 
twenty-five times 1998 earnings. These figures also include the value of cash held by Thermo 
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chase newly issued preferred stock. Among the conditions imposed by the 
cable companies as a condition of investing were amending the bylaws to 
enable them  to elect seven of fifteen directors, requiring  supramajority 
approval by  the board  of major management decisions, restricting the 
alienability of the preferred stock so that its ownership stayed with the 
cable companies, and acquiring the right of first refusal to buy Ted Turn- 
er’s  stock. This agreement remained  in force, despite Ted Turner’s sub- 
sequent expressions of dissatisfaction, for the remainder of the time that 
Turner  Broadcasting  was  a  stand-alone  public  c~rporation.~  (Turner 
Broadcasting merged with the Time/Warner Corp. in  1996.) Under these 
conditions, Ted Turner was effectively constrained by organizational mech- 
anisms, his majority ownership of the common stock notwithstanding. 
5.2.1  Sample Description 
We use a sample of public corporations that have majority shareholders 
to  investigate constraints  on large-block  shareholders.  We  choose  this 
sample for several reasons. First, these block investors presumably have 
the greatest latitude for opportunistic  behavior  toward  minority  share- 
holders. If there are constraints on majority shareholders, it is likely that 
the same constraints bind blockholders who own less than a majority of 
the stock. Second, we used this sample in Holderness and Sheehan (1988) 
to investigate the organizational role of large-block shareholders. A major 
conclusion of that research was that “the evidence is inconsistent with the 
proposition that individuals or corporations hold majority blocks of stock 
in publicly traded corporations primarily to expropriate or consume cor- 
porate resources” (p. 344). It thus appears that the blockholders in this 
sample are constrained. In the current paper, we attempt to identify and 
analyze these constraints. Finally, we  have no reason to believe that the 
constraints on large shareholders, whatever they are, have changed sig- 
nificantly since the sample was constructed. 
To generate a sample of majority shareholder corporations, we  search 
CDA Investment Technology’s January 1980 Spectrum, which lists major 
shareholders in several thousand public firms. For inclusion in the sample, 
we require that a firm have a majority shareholder for at least two consecu- 
tive years.5 In the interests  of data availability, we  limit our sample to 
NYSE and Amex firms. This process yields 114 firms that had majority 
shareholders for approximately 500 firm years between  1978 and 1984. 
4. It should be noted that such dissatisfaction was voiced by  the block investor, not by 
minority  shareholders. Turner  Broadcasting stock  significantly outperformed  the market 
while these constraints were in place (Holderness and Sheehan 1991). 
5.  Majority shareholders  are defined as individuals or entities that own more than  50 
percent of a firm’s common stock. Entities are typically other corporations but occasionally 
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Information about the block  investors and their firms is collected from 
annual proxy statements and Compustat. 
To  ascertain  whether  organizational  constraints  are strengthened  or 
modified in majority-shareholder firms, we attempt to pair each of the 114 
majority-shareholder  firms with  a firm that has the same two-digit  SIC 
industry code, is closest in total assets, and is listed on the NYSE or Amex. 
To identify differences associated with concentrated ownership, we require 
that no single shareholder owns more than  20 percent  of the compari- 
son firm’s stock. Using these criteria,  we  are able to pair  101 majority- 
shareholder corporations. These paired comparisons are the basis for many 
of the tests in this section of the paper. 
Two characteristics of majority-shareholder  firms are pertinent to our 
analysis. First, corporations are majority shareholders in 50 percent of the 
firm years in the sample, individuals own the blocks in 46 percent of the 
firm  years,  and the remaining  blocks  are  held  by  charitable or voting 
trusts.  Many  of  the empirical  regularities  reported  in  Holderness  and 
Sheehan (1988) differ for corporate and individual majority Shareholders. 
Interestingly, some legal scholars have been particularly critical of judicial 
laxness in regulating the relations between parent corporations and par- 
tially owned,  publicly  traded  subsidiaries. Accordingly,  throughout this 
paper, we differentiate between firms controlled by other corporations and 
those controlled by individuals. 
The second  regularity  is  that  90  percent  of  the individual  majority 
shareholders and representatives of 94 percent of the corporate majority 
shareholders are either directors or officers. In other words, majority share- 
holders are active investors.  Because most  empirical  regularities do not 
depend on whether a majority shareholder or a representative of a cor- 
porate majority shareholder is an officer or a director, and because those 
few majority shareholders who are not managers can become so at their 
option,  our  investigations  are  based  on the  full  sample  of  majority- 
shareholder firms. 
5.2.2  Boards of Directors 
Boards  of directors are widely viewed as the central internal control 
mechanism in public corporations. It was the directors, for example, who 
engineered the replacement  of long-standing  CEOs at General Motors, 
Westinghouse,  and IBM. Academic research confirms the potential im- 
portance of directors. Gilson (1990), for example, finds that board turn- 
over  following  financial  distress  is  significantly  greater  than  ordinary 
board turnover. Furthermore, the reconstituted board has more bankers, 
blockholders, and outsiders. Similarly, Byrd and Hickman (1992) find that 
announcement-day returns of bidders in tender offers are higher for firms 
with a majority of independent outside directors. 
For the board to exercise control, however, it needs the power to con- Constraints on Large-Block Shareholders  147 
Table 5.1  Comparisons of Board Membership of Majority-Shareholder Firms on the NYSE 
or Amex and a Paired Sample of Firms with Diffuse Ownership in Which No 
Shareholder Owns More Than 20 Percent of the Common Stock (198W4) 
Mean (Median) Value  p-Value 
Majority-  Diffuse-  Wilcoxon 
Shareholder  Ownership  Difference  Signed-Rank  Sample 
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Sources: Data are from annual proxy statements. 
Note: Outside directors are defined as anyone not currently an employee of the firm or (with corporate 
majority shareholders) the parent firm. 
strain management. When managers’ stockholdings are small, the board 
has this power because the managers have relatively few votes in the elec- 
tion of directors. The boards of majority-shareholder  firms, by contrast, 
would  seem to lack this power because a majority  shareholder has the 
votes  to elect  and fire  directors  unilaterally.  Under the conditions  de- 
scribed below and summarized in tables 5.1 and 5.2, however, the board 
has greater power to constrain a block investor. 
Outside Directors 
Outside directors are usually portrayed  as being more independent of 
management and thus offering more protection for shareholders than in- 
side directors, who, by definition, are employees of the firm. For example, 148  Clifford G. Holderness and Dennis P.  Sheehan 
Table 5.2  Comparisons of Methods of Electing Directors and the Frequency of Board 
Subcommittees for 101 Majority-Shareholder Firms on the NYSE or Amex and a 
Paired Sample of Firms with Diffuse Ownership in Which No Shareholder Owns 
More Than 20 Percent of the Stock (1980-84) 
Variable 
Mean (Median) Value (YO)  p-Value of 
X2-Statistic Testing 
Majority-  Diffuse-  for Homogeneity 
Shareholder Firms  Ownership Firms  of Populations 
Full sample: 
Firms having staggered 
elections for directors 





Individual majority shareholders: 
Firms having staggered 
elections for directors 
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Firms having staggered 
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Sources: Data are from annual proxy statements. 
press  reports  suggest  that outside directors took  the lead in  the three 
prominent  replacements  of  CEOs  noted  above.  Rosenstein  and Wyatt 
(1990) report that the appointment  of  outside directors on average pro- 
duces a positive  stock-price  response. Weisbach  (1988) finds that poor 
stock-price performance is more likely to lead to CEO turnover as the 
ratio of  outside directors to total directors increases. It seems reasonable 
that the independence of outside directors would be a constraining influ- 
ence on managers who own large blocks of  stock as well. 
Table 5.1, however, reports that both the absolute number of  outside 
directors and the ratio of outside to inside directors are lower in majority- 
shareholder firms than in their paired firms with diffuse ownership. These 
differences  can be  attributed  largely  to firms with  individual  majority Constraints on Large-Block Shareholders  149 
shareholders; little difference emerges in either the total number of direc- 
tors, the number of outside directors, or the ratio of outside to total di- 
rectors for firms with corporate majority shareholders and their paired 
firms6  For neither subsample do we find systematic evidence of additional 
outside directors to counterbalance the power of majority ownership. In a 
similar vein, the probability  of a recalcitrant director who, through his 
oversight of management and access to confidential firm information, can 
increase the costs to the block  investor of  acting against the minority 
should  increase  with  the  absolute  number  of  directors. The  fact  that 
majority-shareholder firms tend to have smaller boards than their paired 
firms is evidence that boards typically do not change to counterbalance 
the additional power of a majority shareholder. 
Staggered Elect ions 
Staggered elections of directors are viewed in the agency literature as 
reducing shareholder wealth because they can delay the election of direc- 
tors more attentive to shareholders. But staggered elections also delay the 
firing of directors by a manager with large stockholdings. When a block 
investor elects directors who then prove to be too attentive to minority 
shareholders, under staggered elections he must wait before firing them. 
In the interim, those directors can monitor the investor. As seen in table 
5.2, however, staggered elections are used  in fewer firms with majority 
ownership than firms with relatively diffuse ownership: in our sample, 7 
versus 40 percent (the p-value of the difference is less than 0.01). This 
pattern holds when the sample is divided into individual and corporate 
majority shareholders. 
Cumulative Voting 
Cumulative voting increases directors’  power to constrain  managers 
who own large blocks of stock by increasing the likelihood that minority 
shareholders will  be able to elect representatives to the board. Gordon 
(1993) argues that cumulative voting can assist institutional investors in 
monitoring management. Although directors elected by  minority share- 
holders lack the power to veto a majority shareholder’s decisions, they 
nevertheless gain access to confidential firm information and are included 
in board deliberations. Moreover, if the manager acts counter to the inter- 
ests of minority shareholders, the directors elected by the minority share- 
holders can take the lead in opposition, perhaps by  initiating litigation. 
As reported in table 5.2, however, cumulative voting is found less often in 
6.  For analysis of percentages in table 5.1 and throughout the paper, we report the proba- 
bility value of the two-tailed X2-statistic  used to test whether the paired samples are drawn 
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majority-shareholder  firms than in their paired firms (16 vs. 23 percent), 
although the p-value of the difference is only 0.24. 
Subcommittees 
Other potential board constraints on managers with large-block hold- 
ings are subcommittees of the board, in particular, an audit subcommittee 
composed entirely of outside directors, a similarly composed compensa- 
tion  subcommittee,  or a  special subcommittee to monitor transactions 
between the firm and a dominant shareholder. As detailed  in table 5.2, 
both audit and compensation subcommittees are found in fewer majority- 
shareholder firms than paired firms (84 vs. 91 percent and 63 vs. 72 per- 
cent), with the differences being marginally  significant  (p-value of both 
differences of 0.16).’ In addition, majority shareholders sit on these sub- 
committees significantly more often than do  the largest shareholders in the 
paired firms, further reducing the probability that these bodies constrain 
majority shareholders.* Finally, in the several hundred  proxy statements 
and news articles that we examined for our sample, there were no reports 
of special subcommittees to monitor a majority shareholder. 
5.2.3  Monitoring by Nonmanager Stockholders and Debtholders 
Although  the board is typically  viewed  as the central organizational 
control mechanism, it is not the only one. Both nonmanager shareholders 
and debtholders have incentives to monitor top managers, especially when 
those managers  have  the  additional powers  that  come with  substantial 
stock ownership. Free-rider problems with small shareholders imply that 
large-block shareholders are likely to be more effective monitors (Shleifer 
and Vishny 1986). Our investigations, however, show that, typically, there 
are few large-block shareholders to monitor majority shareholders. In 75 
percent  of the approximately five hundred firm years in our sample, no 
shareholder other than the majority shareholder owns as much as 5 per- 
cent of the common stock. Likewise, 89 percent of the majority-owned 
firms have no directors (other than the majority shareholder) who own 5 
percent of the stock. This is revealing in that the legal rights of directors 
lower monitoring costs. 
Debtholders could  also play an important role in constraining block 
investors,  either  through  board membership  or through  covenants  that 
7. More of the diffusely held firms are listed on the NYSE, which, in contrast to the Amex, 
requires audit subcommittees. Because a majority shareholder can presumably choose the 
exchange listing, however, the difference between the samples remains noteworthy. 
8. Majority shareholders (or representatives of corporate majority shareholders) sit on 40 
percent of the audit subcommittees and on 72 percent of the compensation subcommittees. 
In contrast, only 13 percent of the largest shareholders in the paired firms are on the audit 
subcommittee, and only 25 percent of  them are on the compensation  subcommittee. The 
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limit the investors’ discretion. A necessary (but not sufficient) condition 
for bondholders to exercise additional control rights would be a substan- 
tial debt ratio. Individual majority-shareholder firms, however, have sig- 
nificantly lower total debt-to-asset ratios than their paired firms, and cor- 
porate  majority-shareholder  firms  have  total  debt-to-asset  ratios  that 
equal those of their paired firms.9 The low debt levels further suggest that 
the need to meet debt obligations typically does not discipline managers 
with majority ownership any more than it does managers with smaller 
ownership interests.I0 
5.2.4  Monitoring by Auditors 
A  firm’s  auditor  can  constrain  block  investors  by  identifying  and 
exposing mismanagement  or opportunistic  behavior.”  Because Big  Six 
accounting firms have the most valuable reputations to lose if informa- 
tion about low-quality audits is exposed, they should offer higher-quality 
audits  and  thus  more  protection  for  minority  shareholders  than  do 
smaller, less well-known accounting firms (see DeAngelo  1981). In  our 
paired years, 92 percent of the majority-shareholder firms and 87 percent 
of the comparison firms employ Big  Six firms (p-value of  difference of 
0.29). (This comparison changes little when the sample is divided into indi- 
vidual and corporate majority-shareholder firms.) Accordingly, it is dif- 
ficult to maintain on the basis of  these data that block investors trigger 
additional monitoring by auditors. 
5.2.5 
Finally, block investors could be constrained by reputational considera- 
tions. Individuals, for example, might restrain themselves for this reason, 
or they could be restrained by  relatives’ monitoring to prevent harm to 
the family’s reputation, as might occur with inept management or oppor- 
Reputation as a Constraining Influence 
9. Individual majority-shareholder firms have an average debt-to-asset ratio of 0.18 (me- 
dian 0.16). compared with an average ratio of 0.26 (median 0.26) for their paired firms. The 
p-value of a t-test on the difference in means is 0.02 (the p-value of the Wilcoxon signed- 
rank test is 0.01). Corporate majority-shareholder firms have an average debt-to-asset ratio 
of 0.22 (median 0.20), compared with an average ratio of 0.22 (median 0.22) for their paired 
firms. Both parametric and nonparametric tests show the samples to be indistinguishable. 
10. Jensen (1986) discusses the disciplinary role of debt. 
11. Events at Coated Sales Inc. illustrate how auditors can constrain block investors. In 
1988, Peat Marwick resigned as the firm’s auditor, “saying that it wasn’t  satisfied with repre- 
sentations” made by the company. At that time, Coated Sales said that the dispute involved 
a $6 million payment, but Wall Street analysts were “puzzled that an auditing firm would 
lose an account over a dispute of this nature” (Naj 1988, 12). A special committee of the 
board was formed to investigate the reasons for Peat Marwick’s resignation. Several weeks 
thereafter, the committee found evidence of a false $6 million transaction, and the board 
suspended Michael Weinstein, who was the chairman, CEO, and founder and a 12 percent 
hlockholder.  The  board  then  retained  another  Big  Six  accounting firm  to  investigate 
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tunistic behavior.12 Similarly, corporate block  investors will find it more 
costly to transact with others if they develop a reputation for acting oppor- 
tunistically toward minority shareholders in partially owned subsidiaries. 
Although it is important to acknowledge  these possible constraints, it 
is difficult to measure their effectiveness. We can, however, test whether ma- 
jority shareholders are constrained by the expectation of trips to the capi- 
tal markets.'? When capital market participants observe opportunistic be- 
havior  toward  minority  shareholders,  they  will  demand  a premium  for 
investing (if they invest at all). In contrast, a reputation for acting honestly 
toward minority shareholders will enable a majority shareholder to raise 
capital on more favorable terms. 
If past  trips to the capital  markets are a reasonable proxy for future 
trips, it is noteworthy that in only 9 percent of the firm years in our sample 
do majority-shareholder  firms issue public debt or equity. Their paired 
firms, on the other hand, go to the capital markets in  15 percent of  the 
years  (p-value of  the difference  of  0.24). This difference  is  more  pro- 
nounced between firms owned by individuals and their paired firms (8 vs. 
15 percent, p-value 0.33) than between corporate-owned firms and their 
paired firms (9 vs. 11 percent, p-value 0.88). 
A  firm's  payout  policy  offers complementary  insights  into  potential 
monitoring by capital market participants, on the theory that high payouts 
to shareholders increase the probability of external financing, ceteris pari- 
bus.  High payouts also signal a block  investor's  good faith to minority 
shareholders. As detailed in table 5.3, the dividend yield and the dividend 
payout ratio are lower in majority-shareholder  than in diffusely held firms. 
Following the pattern of  several of the previous  tests, the statistical sig- 
nificance (but not the point estimate) is somewhat more pronounced for 
firms with individual than with corporate majority shareholders. For in- 
stance, individual majority-shareholder  firms distribute to shareholders 
an average of only 13 percent of their pretax earnings, whereas their paired 
firms distribute 25 percent, a difference that produces a p-value of 0.02; 
corporate majority-shareholder  firms distribute 37 percent, whereas their 
paired firms distribute 26 percent, a difference that produces a p-value of 
only 0.61. 
5.2.6  Time-Series Evidence of Changes in Organizational Constraints 
We supplement the preceding cross-sectional evidence with an analysis 
of organizational changes in our 1  14 majority-shareholder  firms between 
1978 and 1984. Large and systematic changes associated with changes in 
12. Fama and Jensen (1983) and DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) suggest intrafamily mon- 
13. Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook (1984) analyze how frequent trips to the capital markets 
itoring in other corporate settings. 
can result in the monitoring of management. Constraints on Large-Block Shareholders  153 
Table 5.3  Comparisons of Payments to Shareholders  for Majority-Shareholder  Firms on the 
NYSE or Amex and a Paired Sample of Firms with Diffuse Ownership in Which 
No Shareholder Owns More Than 20 Percent of the Stock (1980-84) 
Mean (Median) Value  p-Value 
Majority-  Diffuse-  Wilcoxon 
Shareholder  Ownership  Difference  Signed-Rank  Sample 
Variable  Firms  Firms  in Means  Tests  Size 
Full sample: 
Dividends as a  2.3  3.2  .02  .05  94 
percentage of  (1.1)  (2.7) 
year-end stock 
price 
share divided by  (9.9)  (25.7) 
earnings per 

























Dividends as a  2.6  3.2 
percentage of  (1.2)  (2.7) 
year-end stock 
price 
share divided by  (9.3)  (29.5) 
earnings per 
share 







.24  51 
Source: Data from Compustat 
ownership concentration would suggest that firms adapt internally to re- 
duce agency problems associated with majority ownership. Using time- 
series data, we  conduct two tests. First, we  compare the averages for a 
variable (say, the ratio of outside to total directors) for the firm years be- 
fore and after a corporation becomes majority controlled, a “before/after 
classification.” Second, we compare firms on the basis of the year relative 
to their becoming majority controlled, a “relative-year classification,” by 
defining the year in which a firm becomes majority controlled as year 0 
and calculating our statistics by  stratifying on years relative to year 0. In 154  Clifford G. Holderness and Dennis P.  Sheehan 
Table 5.4  Time-Series Analyses of Changes in Organizational Constraints on Top 
Management Associated with the Realization of Majority Ownership for 114 




p-Value  p-Value  Majority Ownership 
Relative-Year  Before/  After  Associated with 
Number of directors 
Number of outside directors 




Audit subcommittee  .99 
Compensation subcommittee  .54 
Cumulative voting  .91 
Staggered voting  .31 
Big Six auditor  .99 
Change in auditor  .94 
Debt-asset ratio 













.65  Increase 
.17  Increase 
.09  Increase 
.02  Decrease 
.46  Decrease 
.53  Increase 
.44  Decrease 
.16  No change 
.98  Increase 
.01  Increase 
Sources: Data from annual proxy statements and Compustat. 
Note: Before/after test compares the values of the variables by  splitting the observations into a period 
before the firm is controlled by a majority shareholder and the period in which it is controlled. Relative- 
year test stratifies the sample by the year in relation to when a firm becomes majority owned. The p- 
value is for the Xz-statistic if the variable is categorical or for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test (or Kruskal- 
Wallis test) if the variable is continuous. Direction of change denotes the change in the median of the 
variable using the befordafter classification. 
contrast to the first time-series test, this test enables us to identify trends 
in relative time. 
Table 5.4 summarizes the time-series tests by reporting the p-values of 
the test statistics and the direction of the difference in the point estimate 
of a variable using the before/after classification. Most of the relative-year 
tests lack  statistical significance. In addition,  we  are unable to perceive 
any economically meaningful  trends  in the averages or medians  of  the 
variables in relative time. The before/after tests, in contrast, reveal some 
statistically  reliable  differences.  As  far  as constraining  majority  share- 
holders, however, the direction  of these changes is inconsistent.  For ex- 
ample, more firms use cumulative voting after becoming majority owned, 
but the use of staggered voting declines. Dividend-payout ratios increase, 
but the amount of external financing is essentially unchanged. Other vari- 
ables do not show strong statistical differences. We interpret the evidence 
in table 5.4 to mean that few dramatic changes occur in an array of poten- 
tial organizational constraints when firms go in and out of majority own- 
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5.2.7  Summary 
Four patterns emerge from the empirical investigations in this section. 
First,  the primary organizational  mechanisms that  the agency literature 
and the financial press view as constraining management do not appear 
to be altered to counterbalance the power of managerial majority stock 
ownership. Indeed, if anything, the data seem to point to fewer organiza- 
tional constraints on management  in majority-controlled  firms. Second, 
this tendency toward fewer organizational constraints is more pronounced 
when  individuals  rather  than  corporations  are  majority  shareholders. 
Third, time-series analysis reveals little evidence that movement from rela- 
tively diffuse to majority ownership is associated with dramatic or system- 
atic changes in organizational constraints. Finally, we  find few examples 
of unusual  or innovative organizational  constraints  on block  investors. 
Turner Broadcasting is the exception. 
In the light of these four patterns, and because some prominent control 
devices-notably,  hostile control activities-are  inoperable in the face of 
a large block of stock held by a block investor, we conclude that organiza- 
tional mechanisms are likely to impose fewer constraints on managers who 
own large blocks than on managers who have small stockholdings. Never- 
theless, individuals are still willing to invest in firms controlled by block 
investors, and firms with block investors do not appear to trade at signifi- 
cant discounts in comparison  to diffusely held  firms. This suggests the 
need to examine the legal constraints on large-block shareholders. 
5.3  Legal Constraints on Block Investors 
5.3.1  Overview 
Potential Legal Const  rain ts 
The breadth of potential  common  law,  statutory,  and administrative 
constraints on large shareholders is evident from examples of day-to-day 
management decisions by large-block shareholders that have violated the 
law.I4  Among these are looting the firm; furnishing a house, buying expen- 
sive cars, and taking sizable cash advances at corporate expen~e;’~  taking 
excessive compensation;16  diverting a business opportunity from the firm;” 
selling property owned by a large shareholder to the firm at above-market 
14. For a more extensive review of the legal doctrines applicable to block investors, see 
15. Corbin v. Corbin, 429 F.  Supp. 276 (M.D. Ga. 1977). 
16. Miller  v.  Magline, Inc., 76 Mich. App. 284, 256 N.W.2d 761 (1977). 
17. Guth t’. Loft Inc.. 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939); Blaustein v.  Pan American Prtro- 
Magnuson (1984) and O’Neal(l975). 
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prices;I8 borrowing money from the firm at below-market interest rates or 
lending to it at above-market rates;I9 paying dividends that leave the firm 
strapped  for cash; preventing dividends from being paid to “force” mi- 
nority shareholders to sell their shares to the blockholder at “depressed” 
prices;20  paying differential dividends; increasing the marketability of the 
majority’s shares by decreasing the marketability of the minority’s shares;21 
selling the control block to someone who plans to loot the firm;22  issuing 
stock at prices that dilute the value of the minority’s stock;2’ and making 
misrepresentations when issuing securitie~.?~  In general, these laws prevent 
non pro rata distributions of corporate  assets (Barclay  and Holderness 
1992a). Remedies include disgorged profits, money damages, and injunc- 
tive relief; in extreme cases, large-block  shareholders can be ordered to 
return all compensation to the firm. 
Many of the legal doctrines applicable to block investors’ management 
decisions,  in  particular,  common law  fiduciary  obligations,  also  apply 
when the minority’s shares are redeemed  through mergers, going-private 
restructurings, and liquidations. In such transactions, additional legal doc- 
trines become relevant, notably, the appraisal remedy, which allows share- 
holders  who  dispute  an offer  price  to seek judicial  valuation  of  their 
shares. #en  fraud or overreaching is alleged, minority shareholders may 
also  seek equitable  relief.25  Finally, there  are potential causes  of action 
under federal and state security laws. 
Assessments of the Law>  EfSectiveness 
In spite of so many decisions against majority shareholders, legal schol- 
ars have widely concluded  that  the law does not significantly constrain 
block investors. The cases in which block investors are constrained appar- 
ently are viewed as anomalies. Brudney’s (1978, 69-70)  summary is repre- 
sentative: 
The parent will inevitably exercise discretion-lawfully  as well as unlaw- 
fully, but substantially undetectable-to  divert assets to itself instead of 
18. Efron v.  Kulmunovitz, 226 Cal. App. 2d  546 (1964). 
19. See 31 A.L.R.2d 671. 
20. Ibid. 
21. Jones v.  H. I?  Ahmunson & Co.,  1 Cal. 3d 93 (1969). 
22. Insurunshures Corp. v.  Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F.  Supp. 22 (D. Pa. 1940); Gerdes v. 
Reynolds. 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (County Ct. Term 1941). 
23. See Annotation, 38 A.L.R.2d 1366 (1954). 
24. Thomus v.  Durulite Co., Inc., 386 E Supp. 698 (D.N.J. 1974). 
25. In  Weinberger v.  UOR Inc., 457 A.2d 701  (Del. 1983), the Delaware Supreme Court 
held that the appraisal remedy is the primary relief for minority shareholders disputing the 
price offered for their shares. The court noted, however, that it did “not intend any limitation 
on the historic powers of the Chancellor to grant such relief as the facts of a particular case 
may dictate.  The appraisal remedy we approve may not be adequate in certain cases, particu- 
larly where fraud, misrepresentation,  self-dealing, deliberate waste of  corporate assets, or 
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sharing them, all to the disadvantage of the public stockholders of the 
subsidiary. . . . [Tlhere is no doubt that the probability of a parent over- 
reaching in self-dealing or appropriating opportunities for itself improp- 
erly but without being  successfully challengeable is real. No less real 
than the probability of the parent thus exploiting the subsidiary on a 
continuing basis is the probability that it will force a merger of the two 
companies on terms which are disadvantageous  to the subsidiary. As 
the parent’s ownership of the subsidiary’s stock increases-e.g.  from 15 
to 20 percent-the  likelihood that it will exercise that power increases, 
not merely because it is more feasible but because of the temptation 
to eliminate at modest cost the nuisance value represented by so small 
a minority. 
Cary’s (1974, 679) critique of Delaware is similar: “The Delaware courts 
have tended to encourage freedom of action on the part of parent compa- 
nies incorporated in that state and have indicated little concern over the 
fairness of  dealings with subsidiaries. The consistent  philosophy  favors 
controlling  shareholders  and  leaves fiduciary questions  to the business 
judgment of an indentured board. The old concept that each party is ‘en- 
titled to what fair arm’s length bargaining would probably have yielded’ 
has been enveloped in a new and labyrinthine rationale.”26 
The pessimistic assessment of legal scholars evidently comes from inter- 
preting case and statutory law.  To  our knowledge,  the law’s critics have 
cited no empirical evidence. This approach has a potentially serious flaw. 
Even if one concedes that there are only a “few anomalous” cases in which 
block investors have been constrained, it does not follow that the law is 
ineffective. As Gould (1972) explains, no lawsuit on an issue is consistent 
both with a law that is totally ineffective and with one that is totally effec- 
tive. In the latter case, all parties realize that the law is perfectly enforced; 
they  rationally  avoid  the prohibited  act; and no lawsuits are therefore 
ever filed.27 
We  first assess the effectiveness of legal constraints on block investors 
by  evaluating the frequency of reorganizations  in which majority share- 
holders redeem the minority’s shares. If block  investors-especially  ma- 
jority shareholders-can  do whatever they want, there would appear to 
be little reason to buy out minority shareholders. Reorganizations of ma- 
jority shareholder firms would be rare. We next examine the wealth trans- 
fers from the majority to the minority shareholders. Small payments would 
26. For a similar but more recent critique of Delaware law, see Rock (1994). 
27. We  could find no reports in the Dow Jones News Retrieval Service or in  Standard 
and Poor’s News Reports for the period 1979-September  1986 of any  lawsuits contesting 
management decisions of majority shareholders in our sample of 114 firms. As noted above, 
this finding is consistent with the proposition that minority shareholders perceive that they 
have no legal protection as well as with the contrary proposition that all parties perceive the 
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indicate relatively minor legal constraints. We then examine trades of large- 
percentage blocks of stock. We also compare how minority shareholders 
fare in reorganizations in the United States, which at least has laws on the 
book to protect  minority  shareholders, with anecdotal evidence on how 
minority shareholders fare in New Zealand, which has no such laws. Fi- 
nally, we cite recent research on the lack of protections for minority share- 
holders in countries other than the United States. 
5.3.2  Evidence from Corporate Reorganizations 
Frequency of Reorganizations 
Table 5.5 reports how often firms in our paired sample were acquired, 
taken private, or liquidated between  1980 and 1986. Over the seven years 
followed, 36 percent of the majority  shareholders  redeem the minority’s 
shares. By comparison, only 29 percent of the paired firms are reorganized 
over the same period.28  This evidence is consistent with Morck, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1988a), which found that the probability  of a Fortune 500 
firm’s being acquired between  1981 and 1985 increased with the percent- 
age of common stock owned by its top two managers. Our evidence is also 
consistent with the frequency with which parent firms reacquire the pub- 
lic’s shares in partially owned carve-outs.*’ 
Wealth Transfers to Minority Shareholders 
The effect on minority shareholders’ wealth associated with reorganiza- 
tions is measured with a sample of forty-three mergers, going-private re- 
structurings, and liquidations of majority-shareholder  firms. Twenty-two 
of these reorganizations are drawn from the sample of 101; three involve 
firms from the original sample of 114 that we were unable to pair; ten are 
identified by searching the annual company index of the Wall Street Jour- 
nalline by line for the period 1978-82; and eight are identified from Austin 
Associates’ database of tender offers between 1981 and 1984. All the reor- 
ganizations involve NYSE or Amex firms, announcements reported in the 
Wall Street Journul, and a majority block in place at the time of the offer 
to minority shareholders. 
We  use standard event-study methodology  to measure  stock-price re- 
actions associated with the initial public announcement that a majority- 
shareholder  firm  is  being  acquired,  taken  private,  or liquidated.  The 
2X. Table  5.5 also shows that minority shareholders are bought  out significantly more 
often by  corporate majority shareholders (40 percent) than they are in similar firms with 
diffuse ownership (21 percent) (the difference is significant at the 0.05 levelj. 
29. Klein, Rosenfeld, and Beranek (1991) report that the parent eventually reacquired the 
subsidiary’s publicly held shares in twenty-five of the eighty-three carve-outs between 1966 
and 1983. In fourteen additional cases, the parent sold its block to a third party; nine of 
these buyers declared that they intended to buy the public’s interest. Table 5.5  Frequency of Reorganizations  between 1980 and 1986 for 101 Majority-Shareholder Firms on the NYSE or Amex and a Paired Sample 
of 101 Firms with Diffuse Ownership in Which No Shareholder Owns More Than 20 Percent of the Common Stock 
Full Sample (“A))  Individual Majority Shareholder (“h) 
Majority-  Diffuse-  Majority-  Diffuse- 
Shareholder Firms  Ownership Firms  Shareholder Firms  Ownership Firms 
Corporate Majority Shareholder (“h) 
Majority-  Diffuse- 
Shareholder Firms  Ownership Firms 
Merger  25 
Liquidation  5 
Going private  6 





















Source: Data from Compustat and the Wall Street Journal. 
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market model is estimated to adjust for general movements in stock prices. 
The intercept and slope are estimated from a sample of approximately 100 
trading days, beginning 351 days before the event day, which is the day 
the reorganization is announced in the Wall Street Journal. 30 Using these 
estimated parameters, we  generate predicted returns for 250 trading days 
before through  10 trading days after the event day. Abnormal returns are 
calculated as the difference between the actual and the predicted returns. 
The abnormal returns are next averaged across events, that is, across initial 
announcements  of  the  reorganizations,  to form  a  portfolio  abnormal 
return: 
where AR,, is the abnormal return for firm i at time  t,  and n, which is 
constant over all days in the event period (250 days before through 10 days 
after the event day), is the number of firms. Finally, cumulative abnormal 
returns  are  formed  by  summing  the daily  abnormal returns  over  the 
event period. 
We  use a standard t-test  to measure the statistical significance of the 
abnormal  returns  associated  with  the  announcement  that  a  majority 
shareholder is buying out minority shareholders. The standard deviation 
of the average abnormal returns is computed over the comparison period. 
Under the null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns, the ratio of the event- 
period  abnormal  return  to the  standard deviation  is treated  as a unit- 
normal random variable. The variance of the cumulative return is gener- 
ated by  summing the sample variance of the abnormal returns over the 
number of days contained in the cumulative return; a similar procedure is 
followed for the event-day returns (days -  I, 0, where day 0 is the day of 
the initial Wall Street Journal announcement of the transaction). 
Table 5.6 summarizes the cumulative returns and t-statistics for various 
periods surrounding these announcements. Minority shareholders experi- 
ence substantial wealth gains when their ownership interest is redeemed 
by majority shareholders. At the announcement itself (days -  1, 0), stock 
prices increase on average by  12 percent. The null hypothesis of a zero ab- 
normal return over these two days can easily be rejected (t-statistic 19.6). 
Stock-price increases immediately preceding the announcements suggest 
that the event-day returns understate the wealth effects for minority share- 
holders (possibly because of leakage of information). From twenty days 
preceding through ten days after announcements of reorganizations, stock 
30. The actual number of  observations in the estimation period varies because not all 
securities trade on all days. If a security did not trade on a particular day, that day is passed 
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Table 5.6  Summary of Abnormal Stock-Price Returns for Various Periods Surrounding the 
Initial  Wall Street Journal Announcement That a Majority-Shareholder  Firm on 
the NYSE or  Amex Is Being Acquired, Taken Private, or Liquidated (1978-84) 
250 Days before  20 Days before 
through 10 Days  through 10 Days after 
after the Initial  Initial Public  the Initial Public 
Announcement of a  Announcement of a  Announcement of a 
Reorganization  Reorganization  Reorganization 
Average abnormal stock 
return (%I)  30 
t-statistic  4.  I 







Source:  Data from the Wall Street Journal. 
prices increase on average by 23 percent (t-statistic 9.0). Ninety-one per- 
cent of the abnormal returns over this period are positive. 
Payments  to minority shareholders in these reorganizations  approxi- 
mate those made in reorganizations in general. For instance, Jensen and 
Ruback (1983) summarize a number of empirical studies and report that 
premiums to shareholders in friendly mergers average approximately 20 
percent .31 
5.3.3  Evidence from Block Trades 
As part of the perceived ineffectiveness of the law, some scholars warn 
that small shareholders will be taken advantage of by larger shareholders 
in reorganizations. Although, under federal securities law, all shareholders 
must receive the same price per share in a tender offer, in other circum- 
stances there is no requirement of equal treatment. Thus, the way is seen 
as open for someone to purchase a large block, wait a short period, and 
then purchase the minority’s interest at a lower price per share. Robert 
Clark (1986, 468) sees “the equal treatment  problem as . . . the salient 
problem posed by two-step acquisitions.” 
Barclay and Holderness (1989, 1992a, 1992b) examine 106 trades of at 
least  5  percent  of  the common  stock  of  exchange-listed corporations. 
After 51 of these trades, the firm is acquired, typically by  the block pur- 
chaser. Contrary to the fears of legal scholars, Barclay and Holderness 
31. Similarly, Slovin and Sushka (1998) find that, when parent corporations merge with 
partially owned subsidiaries, shareholders in the subsidiaries receive approximately the same 
premiums as do shareholders in arm’s-length mergers. Klein, Rosenfeld, and Beranek (1991) 
find that, when parent firms reacquire the public’s interest in an equity carve-out, the minor- 
ity shareholders in the acquired firm earn abnormal returns that approximate those earned 
by  target firms in arm’s-length mergers and acquisitions. 162  Clifford G. Holderness and Dennis P.  Sheehan 
(1992a) find that, in 86 percent of these reorganizations, minority share- 
holders receive at least as much per share as did the block  seller (unad- 
justed for market movements or inflation). 
This equality of  payments  to majority  and minority shareholders ap- 
pears to be an example of an implicit legal constraint, as no law explicitly 
requires equal payment in reorganizations  that follow block  trades. Im- 
plicit constraints will be overlooked if (as the legal critics have apparently 
done) one interprets only reported case law and fails to examine the empir- 
ical evidence. 
5.3.4  New Zealand Comparison 
The treatment of minority shareholders in reorganizations in the United 
States appears quite different from the experience of minority sharehold- 
ers in New Zealand, which has few legal protections for minority share- 
holders.  In  New  Zealand,  minority  shareholders  typically  receive sub- 
stantially  less in  reorganizations  than  do large-block  shareholders.  For 
example, when the Lion Corporation was taken over by the L. D. Nathan 
Corporation,  minority  shareholders  received  only  60 percent  on a  per 
share basis of what was paid to Fay Richwhite, a 35 percent blockholder 
in Lion. Similarly, when the James Smith Corporation was purchased  by 
Mancorp Holdings, an 8  1 percent blockholder received twice as much per 
share as did other shareholders (Easton 1988, 40; see also Nathan 1986). 
Despite public outcries over such inequality, many defend it. For example, 
the chairperson  of  a major  New Zealand  corporation  “said that  small 
shareholders would be naive to expect the same treatment as larger hold- 
ings.” In 1984, the New Zealand Treasury announced its opposition to a 
“proposal to give small shareholders more rights in takeovers because it 
would attenuate property rights to the proceeds of investments in control- 
ling blocks of shares and investments in information” (Easton 1988, 40). 
5.3.5  Assessment of the Evidence 
It is difficult to reconcile the evidence reported above with  the wide- 
spread belief that the law does not constrain block investors. If minority 
shareholders  cannot constrain block  investors,  majority  shareholders- 
who should be the least constrained of all block investors-would  have 
little reason to reorganize their firms to eliminate minority  shareholder^.)^ 
32. For example, even if  a blockholder has nonpublic, favorable information about the 
firm’s expected cash flows, it would still be irrational for him to buy out minority sharehold- 
ers if  they were powerless to constrain him. In this case, he could simply expropriate the 
higher than anticipated cash flows through opportunistic behavior. On the other hand, if 
minority shareholders can constrain the blockholder, then such asymmetry of information 
could provide the impetus for a buyout of minority shareholders (see Bebchuk and Zingales, 
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These buyouts are neither isolated events nor insignificant wealth transfers 
from majority to minority shareholders. 
The payments to minority shareholders suggest a lower bound on the 
constraints that minority shareholders can impose on majority sharehold- 
ers. To be sure, the removal of minority shareholders can result in addi- 
tional benefits for majority shareholders, notably, elimination of the direct 
costs of complying with SEC regulations. These costs, however, are esti- 
mated to range between only $75,000 and $200,000 annually,33  If they are 
capitalized (say, at a real rate of 5 percent), majority shareholders would 
save between  $1.5 and $4 million, far less than the transfers we  observe, 
which average $313.1 million (median $20.5 million). 
Although it would be inappropriate to attribute these reorganizations 
and transfers solely to minority shareholders’ legal rights to constrain ma- 
jority shareholders,  our evidence that organizational  constraints appear 
to be less important in majority-owned firms than in diffusely held firms 
makes the case for the influence of law compelling. 
The influence of the law is further suggested by  the conceptual differ- 
ences between offers to acquire diffusely held firms and offers to acquire 
the minority’s stock in a majority-shareholder firm. Although the determi- 
nants of offer premiums are not yet well understood, several reasons why 
acquirers typically offer substantial premiums to acquire publicly held cor- 
porations have been  advanced: to match alternative  bids; to induce the 
tender of more shares when the supply curve slopes up (perhaps reflecting 
different tax situations among the firm’s shareholders); to reduce manage- 
rial resistance; and to overcome free-rider problems that can cause atomis- 
tic shareholders not to tender their shares. All these considerations are less 
relevant  with  majority-shareholder firms than with diffusely held firms. 
Theoretically, majority shareholders can unilaterally approve most reorga- 
nizations because they control more than 50 percent of the votes.34  More- 
over, through  side payments  for majority  blocks,  majority  shareholders 
and acquirers should be able to avoid sharing with minority  sharehold- 
ers the benefits of deploying corporate resources to more productive uses. 
Yet, in spite of these differences, minority shareholders in majority-owned 
firms receive approximately the same premium for their shares as share- 
holders in diffusely held firms. 
Finally, one can also discern the constraining influence of the law from 
casual evidence, such as reports in the financial press and litigation insti- 
33. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Rice (1984, 372) report the estimates of a number of corpo- 
rations on the direct costs of SEC compliance to arrive at this range. 
34. To  be sure, majority shareholders sometimes choose not to vote in reorganizations. 
But this raises the question why? As courts often look to this factor in appraisal proceedings. 
it appears that the decision of majority shareholders not to vote in reorganizations is one 
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tuted by minority shareholders, as well as from the difference between the 
treatment of minority shareholders in the United States and New Zealand. 
In the absence of alternative explanations or contradictory evidence, the 
case for the influence of law appears persuasive. 
Our finding regarding the importance of the law as a protector of  mi- 
nority shareholders is also largely consistent with the finding of La Porta 
et al. (1997) that legal protections for small shareholders in public corpo- 
rations  vary  substantially  across countries, with the greatest protection 
coming in common law countries, such as the United States. Although we 
do not make systematic international comparisons,  our finding that  the 
law protects minority shareholders from large shareholders in the United 
States is consistent with their finding that the common law protects small 
investors. The apparently greater protection for minority shareholders in 
reorganizations in the United States compared with New Zealand raises 
the possibility of important differences in the legal protections for minor- 
ity shareholders among common law countries (a possibility not explored 
by La Porta et al.). 
La Porta et al. (1997) further suggest that concentrated ownership is a 
partial response to inadequate legal protections for small investors.  We 
have our doubts about this claim because of the possibility of large share- 
holders exploiting minority shareholders. There are certainly press reports 
of this happening, for example,  in Asian corporations (“Asia’s minority 
shareholders have every reason to worry about how they are treated. . . . 
Dominant families, byzantine corporate structures and overly cozy politi- 
cal relationships leave minority shareholders  at a disadvantage” [“Asia’s 
Stock Nightmare”  1997, 1071). In any event, an international analysis of 
the legal constraints on large shareholders is a topic worthy of  future in- 
vestigation. 
5.3.6  Evidence of Additional Concerns about Block Investors 
Our evidence also addresses other concerns that have been raised about 
block investors.  Here again, the pessimism  of legal scholars is not sup- 
ported by the evidence. 
Management Prior to Acquiring Minority  j. Interest 
Our evidence is inconsistent with the suggestion that a block investor 
might manage the firm in a way that drives down eventual payments for 
minority shareholders in a re~rganization.’~  Specifically, the average stock- 
35. Bebchuk (1985, 1712-13),  e.g., argues, “The acquirer [of a substantial percentage of a 
firm’s common stock] might also manage the target’s operations so as to lower further the 
elements of the appraisal remedy. For example . . . the acquirer might depress the target’s 
market price in that period by using its control over both the target’s dividend policy and its 
release of information. Finally, it is worth noting that the prospect of a future takeout might 
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price increase over the year preceding the reorganization (from day -250 
through day -  10) is 9.8 percent (t-statistic 1.4). Over the entire event pe- 
riod (from day -250  through day lo), abnormal returns average 30 per- 
cent (t-statistic 4.1). 
Magnitude of Payments to Minority Shareholders 
Although size, of course, is in the eye of the beholder, one must question 
whether the payments that we document are consistent with the claim that 
large-block shareholders often choose  “to eliminate at modest  cost the 
nuisance value represented by so small a minority” (Brudney  1978, 70). 
Payments to minority shareholders are in  the tens and sometimes hun- 
dreds of millions of dollars and approximate those paid in arm’s-length 
mergers. 
Potential Problems with  Corporate Blockholders 
The  wealth  gains  for  minority  shareholders  are  statistically  similar 
whether individual managers or corporations redeem the shares, despite 
underlying differences in the nature of the restructurings. From day -20 
through day 10, shareholders in corporate-controlled firms experience ab- 
normal gains of 24 percent (median 16 percent), and shareholders in firms 
controlled by  individuals experience wealth gains of 28 percent (median 
23 percent). Both parametric and nonparametric tests yield insignificant 
differences. Similar results are documented at the announcement  of  the 
reorganization. This evidence and the evidence that payments to minority 
shareholders approximate the acquisition payments  to  shareholders in 
diffusely held firms are inconsistent with the assertion that premiums in 
parent-subsidiary mergers will “not [be] as much as in arm’s-length merg- 
ers or overhead take-overs’’ (Brudney 1978, 73). 
5.4  Conclusion 
There is a widespread belief that the law does not effectively constrain 
large-block shareholders. Such a conclusion presents a challenge to those 
who maintain that large shareholders can improve corporate performance. 
The  empirical  evidence presented  in  this paper-which  to our  know- 
ledge is  the first evidence of constraints on block investors-calls  into 
question the widespread pessimism about the power of the law to con- 
strain block investors. We base this conclusion on three broad empirical 
regularities. 
The first regularity is that firms with block investors are surviving. This 
is evidenced by the number of firms with blockholders and by data show- 
ing that these firms are decreasing in neither size nor numbers. Moreover, 
concentrated ownership does not appear to decrease firm value signifi- 
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unconstrained. Given their voting power, there simply would be too much 
latitude for opportunistic behavior and inept management. 
The second  regularity  is that  managers who own majority  blocks  of 
stock appear to be less constrained by  organizational  mechanisms than 
are managers with small stockholdings. Most majority-shareholder boards 
lack features such as cumulative voting and a preponderance of outside 
directors that would help them constrain majority shareholders effectively. 
Likewise, because majority-shareholder firms typically have lower debt- 
to-equity ratios than similar firms with diffuse ownership, it seems unlikely 
the debtholders monitor majority shareholders to a greater  extent than 
they monitor managers with smaller stockholdings. A pattern of internal 
financing suggests that trips to the capital markets do little to augment 
other reputational considerations that may constrain majority sharehold- 
ers. Finally, we find few examples of innovative organizational constraints 
counterbalancing the power of large-block ownership. 
The final broad empirical regularity that we identify is that the law ap- 
pears to constrain majority shareholders both in their day-to-day manage- 
ment and when they redeem the ownership interest of minority sharehold- 
ers. In mergers, going-private restructurings,  and liquidations,  minority 
shareholders receive premiums similar to those paid when more diffusely 
owned  corporations  are reorganized,  suggesting  that  the  law  prevents 
block investors from using their voting power to freeze out minority own- 
ers at low prices. Despite these premiums, majority shareholders buy out 
minority shareholders at least as often as firms with relatively diffuse own- 
ership are similarly reorganized. In addition, although the law  does not 
explicitly require it, small shareholders receive the same amount per share 
in acquisitions that follow block trades as do  block sellers. These payments 
appear in part to be the price that majority shareholders must pay to elimi- 
nate the constraint of minority-shareholder litigation. 
We  do not conclude that the evidence suggests that the law  perfectly 
constraints  block  investors.  Examples  of  block  investors who  have  led 
their firms into financial distress, such as the Wang family, show this not 
to be the case. Nor do we conclude that the law is a greater constraint on 
block investors than are organizational factors. Instead, we conclude that 
the law, especially legal prohibitions on non pro rata distributions of firm 
assets, is an important constraint on block investors. Our conclusion that 
the law effectively constrains blockholders, however, conflicts with the pre- 
vailing academic view. Logic, however, supports it, The fundamental dif- 
ference between the law and most internal organizational  constraints on 
managers who own large blocks of stock is that the law is largely beyond 
the influence of those who are to be constrained. This is the essence of 
a constraint. Constraints on Large-Block Shareholders  167 
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Comment  Mark R. Huson 
Large percentage blocks of shares may be accumulated to improve man- 
agement, to secure benefits that do not accrue to other shareholders, or 
both. In the first case, the blockholder monitors management in order to 
promote good decisions and/or prevent bad ones. In these instances, all 
shareholders share the benefits that arise. Such blockholders  will be as- 
sociated with higher firm values. In the second case, the blockholder uses 
his superior voting  power to secure private benefits.  Blockholders  who 
acquire control positions in order to expropriate will be associated with 
lower firm values  to the extent  that they  can actually consume  private 
benefits. The paper by Clifford Holderness  and Dennis Sheehan is con- 
cerned with  the second case. In particular,  it asks what prevents block- 
holders  from diverting  value  to themselves  at the expense  of  minority 
shareholders. 
Their paper does several things. First, it documents that firms with ma- 
jority ownership  survive  and that they  do not trade at substantial  dis- 
counts to firms with diffuse ownership. Next, it looks to organizational 
mechanisms that might control a majority holder’s ability to consume per- 
quisites. Finally, it looks to the law as a constraint  on the behavior  of 
blockholders. This last exercise is in a way the central focus of the paper. 
The authors look at this issue in the light of what they see as a pessimistic 
view  held  by  legal scholars about the effectiveness of  laws designed to 
control blockholders. 
Blockholders, Survival, and Discounts 
While reading the section on the survival of majority-ownership firms, 
I was reminded of William H.  McNeill’s Plagues and Peoples (1976), which 
discusses disease vectors and their effects on populations. What made me 
think of this book was the idea that majority owners who accrue private 
benefits are a lot like parasites. McNeill’s book discusses virulent and non- 
virulent  parasites.  Nonvirulent  parasites  “realize” that  they  depend  on 
their hosts for survival and do not consume the host to the point of its 
demise. If majority owners are of the nonvirulent nature, it is not surpris- 
ing that the firms they control survive. I discuss this issue more when I 
deal with the legal constraints on blockholders. 
As far as discounts for majority-controlled  firms, it is not clear a priori 
whether they should be expected. Consider a majority  owner who both 
monitors and consumes. In this case, the positive effects of increased mon- 
itoring will offset the negative effects of perquisite consumption. The net 
effect of this on firm value is ambiguous. Even if majority owners either 
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monitor or consume, this problem affects the examination of average dis- 
counts. The positive effects that monitors have on some firms will be offset 
by the negative effect of self-dealing in other firms. 
What might be more informative is an examination of the dispersion in 
discounts of majority-owned firms relative to the dispersion of  discounts 
in diffusely owned firms. Such an analysis might point to firms where the 
consumption  effects are stronger  than the  alignment  effects. Finally, a 
stronger test might come from looking at marginal Q-ratios. What I have 
in  mind  is  an analysis  of  the market  reaction  to acquisitions  made by 
majority-owned firms and diffusely held firms. If majority-held firms make 
acquisitions  to benefit  the majority  owner at  the  expense of  the other 
shareholders, the market should react more negatively to announcements 
by  these  firms. Huson (1998) finds differential  market  responses to an- 
nouncements of acquisitions and divestitures by firms under different gov- 
ernance regimes. 
In  their  summary  of  the  evidence  regarding  survival  and discounts, 
Holderness  and Sheehan  conclude  that  there is no evidence  that  block 
investors pronouncedly  decrease firm value. Given the possible offsetting 
effects of monitoring  and consumption  and the problem  with  averages 
mentioned above, this conclusion is strong. They go on to say that major- 
ity owners must be constrained. However, there is evidence consistent with 
the proposition that majority owners do consume. For example, Barclay 
and Holderness (1 989) document an average control premium of 20.4 per- 
cent associated with the exchange of  blockholdings.'  They interpret this 
premium as representing the anticipated (net) private benefits of  the con- 
trol stake. Additionally, Holderness and Sheehan report various instances 
of majority owners who have been caught consuming. The nature of the 
constraint, therefore, must be that of an upper bound on self-dealing. 
Organizational Mechanisms to Counter Self-Dealing 
In this section of the paper, we are introduced to a sample of majority- 
owned firms and their two-digit-SIC- and size-matched control firms. This 
section looks at differences in organizational  constraints on self-dealing 
between the majority-owned firms and the diffusely held firms. The sample 
of majority-owned firms consist of firms that have a single holder  of at 
least 50.1 percent  of a firm's common stock. I will make two comments 
about this sample and then discuss the results of the analysis. 
First,  suppose that  the constraints  on self-dealing  are constant.  The 
benefits of self-dealing are decreasing in ownership. Perhaps a more pow- 
erful sample design would include firms with effective control, say, owner- 
I. Additional evidence that majority owners consume private benefits comes from Bradley 
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ship stakes between 30 and 40 percent. It would be reasonable to expect 
more self-dealing in these firms. These firms could be compared with the 
majority-owned firms. This’  comment is made with consideration of  the 
arguments put forward in Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988). 
The second point deals with the identity of the majority  shareholder. 
Holderness  and  Sheehan  are careful  to  separate individual  blockhold- 
ers from corporate blockholders. This is an important distinction  since 
people, not corporations, make decisions. If diffusely held corporation X 
holds a majority stake in corporation Y,  the CEO of X would have little 
incentive to loot Y since the benefits would accrue to the shareholders of 
X, not to the CEO.*  Also related to the identity of the majority owner is 
the issue of founders. Ritter (1981) documents that insiders retain 72 per- 
cent of the common stock in the 559 firm-commitment IPOs between 1965 
and 1973. This raises the question of how many majority-owned firms in 
this sample are “young” and founder controlled. It might be worth exam- 
ining the different types of majority owners in more detail and considering 
the effect of relative firm age on the relation between firm value and own- 
ership concentration. 
Boards of Directors 
The first organizational constraint on self-dealing examined is the board 
of  directors. In particular,  the paper looks at differences in board com- 
position between majority-owned and diffusely owned firms. Evidence of 
an organizational adaptation would be a higher proportion of outside di- 
rectors in majority-owned firms. The second characteristic is the incidence 
of staggered boards. Holderness and Sheehan argue that staggered boards 
would help prevent self-dealing at majority-owned firms. 
The evidence reported indicates that majority-owned firms have fewer 
outside directors and use  staggered boards less frequently  than do the 
control firms. In  the paper, this is  interpreted as evidence that internal 
mechanisms have not evolved to constrain self-dealing. There are other 
possible interpretations. First, this could indicate that the majority hold- 
ing sufficiently aligns incentives. Since holdings are in excess of 50.1 per- 
cent, the holdings could be a bonding mechanism. If this were the case, 
there would be less need for outside directors to monitor. There would also 
be no need for a staggered board to insulate the manager from wronged 
shareholders. Another interpretation is that the majority owner is a looter 
and does not want to be watched. In this case, keeping outsiders off the 
board and maintaining the ability to fire directors is crucial if self-dealing 
is to be concealed. Finally, if  the sample of majority-owned firms com- 
2. Since Holderness and Sheehan do not find large differences between corporate majority- 
owned firms and diffusely held firms, the remainder of my comments will refer to the results 
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prises young, founder-run firms, the status of the boards could be a func- 
tion of the firms’ investment opportunity sets. Perhaps expertise is more 
valuable than monitoring in these firms. 
Capital Markets 
Constraints  may also come from capital markets.  Debtholders could 
monitor via covenants that limit self-dealing. Additionally, external finan- 
cing would be prohibitively expensive for a firm with a reputation for self- 
dealing. In examining the role of debtholders,  Holderness and Sheehan 
consider a substantial debt ratio to be a necessary (but not sufficient) con- 
dition for bondholders to exercise additional control rights. I do not think 
that the magnitude of the debt load is as important as the nature of  the 
debt load. All else equal, a firm that has $10 million in short-term debt 
is more constrained than a firm that has $10 million in long-term debt. 
Additionally, for similar levels of similar maturity debt, differences in cov- 
enant structures play a role in constraining activity. 
Examination of trips to the capital markets shows no significant differ- 
ence between majority-owned firms and their controls. However, the point 
estimates show that majority-owned firms go less often. When paired with 
the statistically lower dividend-payout rates for majority-owned firms, this 
lends some support for the proposition that capital markets provide some 
monitoring of majority owners. 
Evidence to help us understand the monitoring of capital markets might 
come from an analysis of the terms that govern  new  security issues by 
majority-owned  firms.  Holderness  and  Sheehan  (1991)  point  to  con- 
straints put on Ted Turner when he went to the capital markets. It would 
be interesting to see whether  other majority-owned  firms must agree to 
similar constraints or whether they have a “high” cost of capital. 
The conclusion  of this section is that organizational  constraints have 
not evolved to limit the consumption of private benefits. The lack of orga- 
nizational constraints and the survival of majority-owned firms lead Hold- 
erness and Sheehan to the law as the constraint on self-dealing. 
Legal Constraints on Majority Shareholders 
Holderness and Sheehan point to numerous cases where majority own- 
ers have violated the laws and been called on it. In spite of this evidence 
that the law constrains blockholders, it is reported that legal scholars gen- 
erally conclude that the law does not significantly constrain block inves- 
tors. This section of the paper attempts to supply empirical evidence that, 
on average, majority owners do not engage in self-dealing. The laboratory 
for this analysis is a sample of reorganizations where majority owners re- 
deem the minority’s  shares. The supposition is that, if  the law  were no Constraints on Large-Block Shareholders  173 
constraint, such reorganizations would be infrequent and that, when they 
did occur, minority shareholders would receive small payments. 
The reported evidence indicates that there is little difference in the reor- 
ganization frequencies of majority-owned and diffusely held firms3  Addi- 
tionally, it shows that the buyouts involve significant wealth transfers from 
majority owners to minority shareholders. One possible benefit to taking 
out the minority shareholders is the savings on direct costs of complying 
with SEC regulations, which are estimated to be worth between $1.5 and 
$4 million. This is considered briefly but readily dismissed as being too 
small. If we choose $2.5 million as the savings, this represents about 7 per- 
cent of the median market capitalization of the firms controlled by  indi- 
viduals and over 10 percent of the median wealth transfer to minority share- 
holders. While not the sole determinant of the premia, these savings are 
not trivial. 
This still leaves the question of why premia are paid at all if the majority 
owner is unconstrained and whether the treatment of minority holders in 
mergers is evidence that the law constrains majority owners in their day- 
to-day management. I think that Holderness and Sheehan are correct in 
concluding that it is fear of legal action that prevents majority  owners 
from freezing out minority shareholders.  Around  the time from which 
their data are taken, there was a great deal of uncertainty as to the legal 
standing of minority shareholders. Gilson (1986) reports that, although 
the letter of the law provided minority shareholders with little protection, 
there  was  opportunity  for  interpretation  that  would  benefit  minority 
shareholders. He goes on to discuss the risk aversion of the lawyers struc- 
turing the deal relative to that of the majority owner. He suggests that the 
lawyers might have suggested paying off minority owners rather than face 
the likelihood of being associated with a failed or stalled deal. 
There were also two new weapons added to minority shareholders’ arse- 
nal at this time. In Singer  v.  Mugnuvox (1977), the cost of litigating per- 
ceived self-dealing in mergers was red~ced.~  Prior to Singer, shareholders 
had to act individually. Singer allowed for class actions. Additionally, in 
1979, the SEC passed rule 13e-3, which required officers to state whether 
they believed the offer to minority shareholders to be fair. Making such 
statements opens the majority owners to possible legal actions. 
Holderness  and Sheehan consider the lack  of  self-dealing in  merger 
transactions to be evidence that majority owners are constrained. If the 
null hypothesis is that the law is entirely toothless, self-dealing should be 
3. An exception is that mergers are more likely for firms with corporate majority owners 
than for the control firms. A possible explanation for this is that many of the firms in this 
sample were carved out to facilitate an eventual merger. It would also include the firms that 
are eventually merged back into the parent company. 
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as obvious in merger decisions as anywhere else. However, this is an arena 
where legal scrutiny is likely to be very great. This increases the likelihood 
that  self-dealing will be detected  and at least undone. Majority owners 
must also consider externalities such as reputation effects. This is not the 
most powerful experiment for detecting self-dealing. 
Evidence that majority owners do not fleece minority owners when they 
redeem the latter’s shares in mergers is not evidence that majority share- 
holders are constrained in their day-to-day management. Perhaps better 
evidence comes from the case law anecdotes. In fact, these instances of 
majority owners being caught with their hands in the till suggest that ma- 
jority owners are constrained by the law. That is, there are certain activities 
that are not permitted. 
Since the effectiveness of a law can be measured only with  respect to 
instances of its application, the effectiveness of the law may well be a sec- 
ondary consideration when the self-dealing propensity of majority owners 
is examined. Suppose that the law is fully effective. That is, in the event of 
exposed self-dealing,  the majority  owner  is forced to pay damages and 
banned from ever owning a publicly traded firm again. You might think 
of Victor Posner, the former chairman of the DWG Corporation. In these 
cases,  becoming  a noticeable  self-dealer  is not necessarily  the  optimal 
course. Rather, a majority owner may decide to be less virulent and base 
consumption decisions on the likelihood of discovery and how much he is 
taking from minority shareholders. He can consume to the point where it 
is in no individual shareholder’s interest to incur the costs of preventing it. 
When we look at discovered self-dealers, we are observing the outcome 
of a process that equals one if they are caught and zero if they are not. 
However, self-dealing is not a discrete and dichotomous event. Think of 
it in the following context: 
Z  =  1  ifz* 2  L, 
Z  = 0  ifz* < L. 
The amount of self-dealing is given by  z*. The event that a self-dealer is 
caught and has legal actions directed against him corresponds to Z = 1. 
Whether the self-dealing is enough to trigger legal action depends on L, 
the level of self-dealing high enough to warrant legal action. This level of 
self-dealing will be a function of the gains that accrue to minority share- 
holders  from  ending  the  self-dealing  and  the  costs  of  bringing  legal 
action5 
Majority owners have a wide latitude of behaviors in which they can 
engage to their own benefit if L is high. L would be high if, for example, 
5. This assumes that the minority shareholders act in concert. If they cannot act in concert, 
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class actions are not allowed or if the self-dealing is difficult to identify. In 
the latter case, I have in mind hiring your cousin’s consulting firm to do 
some research, which would be difficult to classify as self-dealing, as op- 
posed  to buying your cousin a new yacht  with  corporate funds, which 
would be easy to classify as self-dealing. The problem with mergers is that 
L is probably low since the price paid to the minority can be compared to 
the price paid to the majority owner. This makes the law relatively effective 
in this case. A test of the effectiveness of this through time might be of 
interest. Examination of the levels and types of self-dealing that are caught 
would show whether L has been changing through time. 
Holderness and Sheehan conclude that, while the law is not a perfect 
constraint, it is an important constraint on majority owners. I think that 
the law provides an upper bound on expropriation. Majority owners who 
stay below this bound will survive. The legal scholars’ view that the law 
does not significantly constrain majority owners may just be a comment 
about their perception of where the upper bound should be. Holderness 
and Sheehan provide us with some evidence of where it is, which should 
help move the debate forward. 
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